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Abstract—Over the last decade, the level of critical 
infrastructure technology has been steadily transforming in 
order to keep pace with the growing demand for the services 
offered. The implementation of the smart grid, which relies on a 
complex and intelligent level of interconnectivity, is one example 
of how vital amenity provision is being refined. However, with 
this change, the risk of threats from the digital domain must be 
calculated. Superior interconnectivity between infrastructures 
means that the future cascading impacts of successful cyber-
attacks are unknown. One such threat being faced in the digital 
domain is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. A 
DDoS has the goal of incapacitating a server, network or service, 
by barraging a target with external data traffic in the form of 
communication requests. DDoS have the potential to cause a 
critical infrastructure outage, and the subsequent impact on a 
network of such infrastructures is yet unknown. In this paper, an 
approach for assessing the future impacts of a cyber-attack in a 
network of critical infrastructures is presented; with a focus on 
DDoS attacks. A simulation of a critical infrastructure network 
provides data to represent both normal run-time and an attack 
scenario. Using this dataset, a technique for assessing the future 
impact of disruptions on integrated critical infrastructure 
network, is demonstrated.  
Index Terms—Critical Infrastructure, Cyber-Attack Distributed 
Denial of Service, Simulation, Cascading Failure 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Critical infrastructures present tempting targets for cyber-
attackers. Society has a high reliance on the services provided 
and any disruption would have severe impacts on the 
economy, social well-being, and potentially even leads to loss 
of life [1]. Their service provision is becoming increasingly 
reliant on ICT networks, meaning they are more vulnerable 
than ever before to attacks emerging from cyber-space. 
Particularly, with the continued integration of wireless 
components and Internet enabled control system software, the 
last decade has seen a significant increase in the number of 
access points within infrastructure networks. 
Traditionally, critical networks were closed to the outside 
world. However, the need for remote access within critical 
infrastructure networks has become increasingly crucial. This 
is predominantly due to their continuing growth, vast 
geographic distribution and increasing dependence on 
automation. In consequence, key service providers are 
increasingly reliant on the interconnectivity and remote access 
to centrally manage the component systems. 
Presently, there is a growing level of interdependence 
between different critical infrastructures. For example, 
through the introduction of the smart grid, power plants, a 
once isolated infrastructure, have become intertwined with 
others to provide a more intelligent distribution service. There 
is also a physical dependence; critical infrastructures rely on 
each other to continue the provision of their own services. For 
example, civilians need to be able to access the emergency 
services at any time; however, the emergency services heavily 
rely on the availability of the telecommunications network; 
which in turn relies upon the provision of stable power supply.  
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, in particular, 
pose a significant threat to critical infrastructures, companies 
and e-government services around the globe. A successful 
DDoS attack on an infrastructure has the potential, to not only 
impact the target, but cause a cascading effect. Often service 
provision crosses borders, meaning any impact would cause 
wide-spread devastation, affecting multiple countries. 
The key challenge lies in the ability to block DDoS attacks, 
which are hard to identify. The nature of the attack means that 
a huge volume of traffic data originates from millions of 
different devices. As the devices are usually owned by law-
abiding civilians, who are unaware of the event taking place, 
blocking the source of the traffic is a challenge. The attacks 
are caused by a hijacked network of computers, known as a 
botnet, controlled by a botmaster. They have the potential to 
be used for serious cyber-criminal activity; as this form of 
attack can be so powerful, the computing power of the target 
is exhausted [2]. As a result, the service provision is disrupted.  
The reasons for a cyber-attack taking place vary. 
Frequently, the motivation is political, whereby key targets are 
taken down by activists or groups with a political message. 
Websites offer ideal targets for DDoS attacks, as they operate 
as the frontend and provide the customer interface, so the 
impact of an attack is noticeable. The effect is that users are 
unable to access the service due to the volume of traffic 
blocking access to the servers hosting the website. One 
example of this was the disruption to Wikileaks, caused by 
traffic at the level of 10 Gigabits per second [3]. Other high-
profile cases, such as the widely publicised attacks on Visa, 
MasterCard and the PlayStation network, show the real-threat 
being faced [4].  
In this paper, the potential effects of a disruption to a 
critical infrastructure network caused by a DDoS are 
presented. In a future, which contains inherent cyber-threat 
insecurities, the need to plan for attacks and improve the level 
of resilience is greatly needed. The remainder of this paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background 
discussion on DDoS attacks. Section 3 presents a simulation 
of a network of critical infrastructures used for data 
construction. Section 4 provides an account of how the 
proposed framework uses data classification techniques to 
analyse subtle changes in critical infrastructure behaviours. 
Section 5 presents a discussion on the results and highlights, 
how the techniques can be used to plan for assessing the 
future impact of cascading failure. Finally, the paper is 
concluded in Section 6. 
2. BACKGROUND 
With the volumes of complex attacks starting to increase, 
there is a real present threat to critical infrastructures. In this 
subsection, the DDoS attack type is presented as a 
demonstration of the variety of attacks facing future critical 
infrastructure technologies. 
2.1 DDoS 
A DDoS attack involves overloading routers and intermediate 
links by sending them enormous volumes of network traffic 
[4]. It effectively functions as a cyber-army, which can span 
across the globe, without the user having to invest in their own 
hardware or own any physical components [5]. The popularity 
of the attack is due to the operator having an objectively high 
level of anonymity. There are numerous different types of 
DDoS, some of which include: SYN flood, peer-to-peer and 
permanent denial of service. Each of which is explained as 
follows: 
 SYN Flood: Known as a Transmission Control Protocol 
Synchronised Flood (SYN Flood), the attack scenario 
involves exploiting the TCP connection establishment 
process [6]. Specifically, to establish a connection, a 
device sends and receives a SYN. The DDoS attack, in 
this case, functions by making the server unavailable and 
the SYN process is blocked. 
 Peer-to-peer: This type of attack normally involves 
forcing clients of significant peer-to-peer file sharing 
centres, to connect to a victim after disconnecting from 
their own network. These attacks operate differently to a 
botnet and the bot computers are often controlled 
individually. 
 Permanent denial of service: Often DDoS attacks can be 
so severe that the target hardware needs replacement as a 
result. This is known as a permanent denial of service 
(PDoS), where backdoors are exploited and used to target 
device firmware which is replaced by the attackers’ own 
firmware. 
The commonality in all types of DDoS attacks is that they are 
problematic to block, as distinguishing between good and bad 
requests to a server is a challenge. Finding a way to improve 
cyber-defences is of huge importance to safeguard the 
increasing use of wireless sensor networks (WSN) and 
dependence on interconnectivity in critical infrastructure 
networks. Consequently, in the following section, the 
vulnerabilities of WSNs are detailed. 
2.2 DDoS and WSNs 
Some specific architectures are particularly vulnerable to 
denial of service attacks. WSNs are one of those. Sensors are 
small devices spread over a monitored area, and they are 
expected to collect physical data upon their environment. 
Because they may be used in remote places or in hostile 
environments (hard to access areas, or battlefields for 
instance), they embed cheap hardware and are subject to 
strong limitations: they have low computation abilities, little 
available memory, and their battery is generally non-refillable. 
For these reasons, and because sensors communicate only 
through wireless protocols, WSNs are especially vulnerable to 
denial of service attacks [7].  
DoS in WSNs embraces many different attacks, which can 
target all layers of the network [8]. Jamming the radio 
frequencies and disturbing the routing protocols are just two 
examples of ways to harm the network. Even jamming can 
actually be performed in a variety of ways [9]. In reaction to 
these, a number of solutions have been proposed [10]. Many 
solutions rely on trust models [11], [12]. Agents then apply a 
set of traffic rules [13] to assign a trust value to each of the 
nodes in the network. In that way, a simple detection system is 
constructed, which consists of a set of nodes called ‘guarding 
nodes’ that analyse traffic in a clustered network [14]. When 
detecting abnormal traffic from a given node, guarding nodes 
identify it as a compromised node and inform the cluster head 
(CH) of this fact. Upon receipt of reports from several distinct 
monitoring nodes (to prevent false denunciation from a 
compromised node), the CH virtually excludes the suspicious 
node from the cluster. The authors show the benefit of their 
method by presenting numerical analysis of detection rate. 
Although the method is efficient for detecting rogue nodes, 
the authors do not give details of the election mechanism for 
choosing the guardian nodes. Also, there is no mention in their 
study of renewing the election in time, which causes the 
appointed monitoring nodes to endorse heavier energy 
consumption over a long period.  
The most effective method of detecting a DoS attack in a 
WSN is simply to run a detection mechanism on each single 
sensor. Of course, this solution is not feasible in a network 
with constraints. Instead of equipping each sensor with such a 
mechanism, it is proposed in [15] to resort to heuristics in 
order to place several nodes equipped with detection systems 
at critical spots in the network topology. This optimised 
placement strategy enables distributed detection of DoS 
attacks and reduces costs and processing overheads, since the 
number of required detectors is minimised. But those few 
selected nodes are likely to run out of battery power much 
faster than normal nodes. Some works examine the possibility 
of detecting the compromising of nodes as soon as an 
opponent physically withdraws them from the network. In the 
method that is developed in [16], each node keeps a watch on 
the presence of its neighbours. The Sequential Probability 
Radio Test (SPRT) is used to determine a dynamic time 
threshold. When a node appears to be missing for a period 
longer than this threshold, it is considered to be dead or 
captured by an attacker. If this node is later redeployed in the 
network, it will immediately be considered as compromised 
without having a chance to be harmful. Nothing is done, 
however, if an attacker manages to compromise the node 
without extracting the sensor from its environment. In [17], a 
revised version of the OLSR protocol is proposed. This 
routing protocol called DLSR aims at detecting distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks and at dropping malicious 
requests before they can saturate a server’s capacity to answer. 
To that end, the authors introduce two alert thresholds 
regarding this server’s service capacity.  
The authors also use Learning Automata (LAs), automatic 
systems, whose choice of next action depends on the result of 
its previous action. There is no indication in their work about 
the overhead or the energy load resulting from the use of the 
DLSR protocol. A novel broadcast authentication mechanism 
can also be deployed so as to cope with DoS attacks in sensor 
networks such as in [18]. This scheme uses an asymmetric 
distribution of keys between sensor nodes and the sink, and 
uses a Bloom filter as an authenticator, which efficiently 
compresses multiple authentication information. In this model, 
the sink, shares symmetric keys with each sensor node, and 
proves its knowledge of the information through multiple 
MAC values in its flooding messages. When the sink floods 
the network with control messages, it constructs a Bloom filter 
as an authenticator for the message. When a sensor node 
receives a flooded control message, it generates their Bloom 
filter with its keys and in the same way sink verifies message 
authentication. 
2.3 Related Research 
There are many concerns surrounding the resilience of 
future critical infrastructure networks, particularly when faced 
with DDoS attacks. One emerging type of critical 
infrastructure network is that of smart utility grids, with their 
increasing levels of complexity, interconnectivity and 
interdependence. Unfortunately, as with most new 
technologies, smart grid security is still in a juvenile stage [19] 
and there is currently a lack of defined standards. Hence, the 
effects that a DDoS attack will have on such dynamic and 
complex networks is extremely difficult to predict and 
therefore largely unknown. 
Smart grids are highly complex networks comprised of 
millions of computing agents; the majority of which will be 
internet-facing. Unfortunately, this means that large parts of 
the grid will be exposed to DDoS attacks, which can 
ultimately lead to cascading failures throughout the 
infrastructure. In a smart electric grid, the predominant idea is 
to balance power distribution. For this, the Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is used, but its openness 
exposes many potential weak points within the network [20] 
that can be targeted by DDoS attacks to maximise impact and 
disruption throughout the grid. For example, targeting smart 
meter aggregators/gateways can prevent current energy 
consumption from being reliably measured. This in turn can 
affect the power availability of local and regional substations 
and ultimately the demand on the power stations.  The 
potential repercussions of such attacks are highly significant, 
ranging from the interrupting the availability of individual 
components, to mass power outages or damage to 
infrastructures. 
The security and resilience of future critical infrastructures 
is of vital significance to their success and functionality. The 
ease at which DDoS attacks can be launched and their high 
level of efficiency is concerning for safety of future critical 
infrastructures. This is particularly prevalent as the EU 
Commission aims to have at least 80% of Europe using smart 
electric meters by 2020 [21]. 
3. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION 
To counter the growing threat of DDoS attacks and predict the 
future impacts of other cyber-attack types, simulation presents 
an ideal tool to experiment with new and innovative security 
measures. In this paper, a simulation of a city, which is used 
to construct data and trace the effects of a DDoS attack in a 
network of critical infrastructures, is presented. The 
simulation consists of seven infrastructures, all interconnected 
by a network of cables and pipes, used for electricity, 
communication and water distribution. The infrastructures 
encompassed include: a power plant, an industrial 
infrastructure, a telecommunications infrastructure, a water 
distribution plant, residential housing and businesses. The 
software is based on object-oriented modelling, where each 
component is an individual object, which can be adjusted. 
When linked together, the system functions, as shown in 
Figure 1.  
A. Simulation 
During simulation run-time, the behaviour of one of the 
infrastructures has a direct impact on another. When a 
component failure occurs, the city is able to keep functioning, 
but the effects of the fault should be visible in the dataset. In 
addition, the effects of a cyber-attack are able to propagate as 
a result of interdependencies. For example, disruption of 
service provision from the power plant would directly affect 
telecommunications and water production, which rely on 
power to function. In the simulation, the individual blue 
blocks represent a visualisation of water flow. The yellow 
blocks represent units of energy generated by the power plant. 
The green blocks represent a network communication between 
infrastructures.  
The system functions consistently during runtime. However, 
the output and behaviour differs slightly each time the 
simulation process takes place, resulting in variance in the 
datasets constructed. 
 
Figure 1 Critical Infrastructure Simulation Overview 
The simulation presented is set in a format which is 
rudimentary to follow, for graphical purposes, and is used to 
construct granular data. Specifically, individual behavioural 
datasets for each of the critical infrastructures operating in the 
networked grid can be constructed. 
B. Experiment Overview 
As previously mentioned, the effects of a DDoS attack on 
one infrastructure may have the potential to cascade 
throughout the network of infrastructures. The aim of this 
research is, therefore, to propose a technique for identifying 
the cascading effects of a DDoS attack in particular. The 
ambition of the research is to develop a technique which can 
assist with the future planning and development of more 
resilient critical infrastructure interconnectivities. Often the 
impact of a minor disruption in one infrastructure on another 
may appear trivial and hard to identify; however, frequently 
the results can have a significant impact on service provision. 
The data constructed from the simulation is used to present 
the effects of a DDoS attack, and propose a system for tracing 
its effects as its impact moves through the network. This 
research is noteworthy, particularly as countries, such as the 
UK, are migrating towards the use of the smart grid. The 
smart grid relies on an interconnectivity of services to offer a 
more intelligent utility distribution network. It is essential to 
plan for disruptions to technologies such as this, and predict 
how cyber-attacks will have a different impact in the future. 
As more digital and automation services are introduced, in 
order to match the growing demand for services offered by 
critical infrastructures, predicting the impact of a cyber-attack 
is vital. 
In the simulation, an attack is introduced to the grid in a 
process which involves overloading the telecommunication 
plant with data requests. This acts as a simulation of a DDoS 
attack; disrupting how the infrastructures to communicate 
between each other. The attack threat is implemented through 
a direct connection to the telecommunications plant from an 
outside source. At this point, data is extracted from the 
simulation when functioning both normally and when under a 
cyber-attack. By completing this process, the dataset can be 
used to propose an approach for predicting the impact of 
attacks, which have the ability to cause a cascading effect. In 
the following section, the methodology and system framework 
is presented. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
As critical infrastructure datasets are significantly large, the 
proposed system operates through a serious of modules, which 
are based in a cloud environment for scalability purposes. The 
aim of the framework is to put forward a technique for the 
prediction of cascading effects in an interconnected network 
of critical infrastructures. 
A. Framework 
This process includes various stages, such as: data 
collection, cleaning and normalisation of raw data, feature 
extraction, data classification and visualisation. Cleaning 
involves verifying that there are no missing values and 
smoothing out data which inconsistent. Noisy data, which 
refers to corrupt and meaningless values, are also removed. 
The features selected are unique for each critical infrastructure 
but they could include: overall water volumes, energy creation, 
water levels or speed of water flow. They are constructed by 
cataloguing the data into designated representations of the 
dataset. Classification is achieved using the features to train 
classifiers to detect subtle changes in system behaviours. This 
process is known as supervised learning. The classification 
results are then visualised in a graphical format and 
communicated to the user through a GUI. The system has its 
own user interface, which allows the operator to interact with 
the system. The framework is displayed in Figure 2 below. 
Data Collection
Network/Data Source
Data Cleaning Feature Extraction
Data 
Classification
Visualisation GUI
 
Figure 2 High Level Framework 
B. Data Classification 
The data classification is essential in order to identify 
variations in patterns of activity, which are often subtle and a 
challenge to identify. The evaluation process discussed in this 
paper uses supervised learning; this involves giving the 
classification algorithms the ‘correct answer’ to allow them to 
operate self-sufficiently. By using this method, classifiers are 
trained using features extracted from the dataset, to identify 
when anomalous behaviour has occurred in one critical 
infrastructure, as a result of a failure in another. 
The approach involves specific data classification 
techniques, including: Uncorrelated Normal Density based 
Classifier (UDC), Quadratic Discriminant Classifier (QDC), 
Linear Discriminant Classifier (LDC), Polynomial Classifier 
(POLYC), k-Nearest Neighbour (KNNC), Decision Tree  
(TREEC), Parzen Classifier (PARZENC), Support Vector 
Classifier (SVC) and Naïve Bayes Classifier (NAIVEBC). 
Each of these classifiers was chosen as they have the ability to 
learn how to recognise abnormal values in a dataset. They also 
employ a supervised learning approach, which is a key part of 
the approach. In the following section, the classification 
evaluation techniques are presented. Each of the techniques 
provides an assessment of the classifiers’ success or failure 
when classifying the data 
5. EVALUATION 
The dataset constructed from the simulation included a 
collection of 29 features and 12 records of data; 6 normal and 
6 abnormal behaviour, for an initial case study. A sample of 
the data is presented in Table 1. The normal behaviour refers 
to when the critical infrastructures are functioning correctly 
and with no interferences. 
Table 1. Data Sample 
Label Feature1 Feature2 Feature3 Feature4 
Normal 13.556 13.556 3.6560 3.6560 
Normal 19.427 19.427 5.4280 5.4280 
Normal 24.488 24.488 7.0840 7.0840 
Normal 30.475 30.475 8.7390 8.7390 
Normal 37.265 37.265 8.3950 10.000 
Normal 6.5170 6.5170 2.0000 2.0000 
Attack 13.556 13.556 9.7120 19.136 
Attack 19.427 19.427 17.195 20.907 
Attack 24.488 24.488 22.563 22.563 
Attack 30.475 30.475 24.219 24.219 
Attack 37.265 37.265 10.000 23.875 
Attack 6.5170 6.5170 5.2000 17.136 
Abnormal behaviour refers to the city functioning in a 
cyber-attack scenario state. The dataset used for the 
classification process was constructed through running the 
simulation for a 24 hour period as normal and a 24 hour 
period under a DDoS attack on the telecommunications 
network. The dataset refers only to the effects of 
communication behavioural changes. As the dataset shows, in 
Table 1, some of the attack and normal behaviour values are 
the same for certain features. However, the changes in 
behaviour can be seen in others. 
A. Approach 
The results of the classification process are calculated using 
a confusion matrix which determines the distribution of errors 
across all classes. The estimate of the classifier is calculated 
as the trace of the matrix divided by the total number of 
entries. Additionally, a Confusion Matrix provides the point 
where miss-classification occurs. In other words, it shows true 
positive (TP), false positive (FP), true negative (TN) and false 
negative (FN) values. Diagonal elements show the 
performance of the classifier, while off diagonal presents 
errors. 
TP FN 
FP TN 
Using the confusion matrix, the success rate of each 
classifier can be evaluated by dividing the number of True 
Positive and True Negative results by the total number of 
feature vectors, as displayed in the following formula: 
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
 
In addition to providing the success rate, the confusion 
matrix also provides the calculation of the sensitivity and 
specificity for each classification. Sensitivity is identification 
of positive results in a data set. This refers to accurately 
detected normal system behaviour and it is calculated using 
the formula: 
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
Whereas, Specificity is the identification of negative results 
and is calculated using the following formula. Again, in this 
paper, this refers to accurately detected normal and anomalous 
system behaviour. 
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
 
Using the confusion matrix, specificity and sensitivity 
results, it is possible to evaluate ability of each of the data 
classifiers abilities to detect anomalous behaviour. 
B. Results 
The results are displayed in Table 2. The classification 
process had mixed results, with an average classification 
success rate of 62.96%. SVC and PolyC were the most 
successful and able to classify 100% of the behaviour 
accurately. The results demonstrate how behavioural patterns 
can be analysed. A change in one infrastructure impacts 
another, and the impact can be identified using the SVC and 
PolyC classifiers. 
 
Table 2. Classification Results 
 
AUC Error Sensitivity Specificity 
LDC 83.33 0.17 1.00 0.67 
UDC 50.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 
QDC 33.33 0.67 0.00 0.67 
SVC 100.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
ParzenC 33.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 
TreeC 66.67 0.33 1.00 0.33 
KNNC 33.33 0.67 0.67 0.00 
NaivebC 66.67 0.33 1.00 0.33 
PolyC 100.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
C. Discussion 
Critical infrastructures, which are seemingly separate, 
heavily rely on each other for an effective service provision. 
The technique presented, demonstrates how it is possible to 
assess the impact of a cyber-attack, in this case a DDoS attack 
in a network of infrastructures. Applying the above technique 
to individual critical infrastructure datasets demonstrates how 
the changes in behaviour of one infrastructure can be 
identified in the operation of another. This can be either 
through a direct or indirect connection. The results show that 
the classifiers are able to identify behavioural changes, with a 
mean average of 62.96%. The sensitivity results (normal 
behaviours), were relatively successful, with 6 of the 9 
classifiers able to identify 100% of the normal behaviour. The 
specificity results, however (attack behaviour changes) were 
less-successful; with only 2, (SVC and PolyC) able to identify 
100% of abnormal behaviour occurrences. For that reason, 
future work will focus on both classifiers for prediction. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The aim of this research is to highlight an innovative approach 
for institutions to calculate the impact of cascading failures, 
and subsequently plan for resilience. The most ideal approach 
for countering the growing cyber-threat problem is to plan for 
the effects of a failure taking place in an interconnected 
network. It is essential to increase the level of resilience by 
ensuring that recovery plans are put in place in order to be 
prepared for when a cascading failure occurs. To expand on 
this work in the future, an enlarged dataset including more 
records will be used. A case study into the individual 
behaviour of one infrastructure, when a fault occurs in another, 
will also be investigated. The simulation of a critical 
infrastructure will be expanded, in order to incorporate a 
greater network or infrastructures and interconnectivities. 
Finally, the future work will also extend the experimentation 
to include data from a real smart grid network, and the 
processing of this data in a cloud environment. 
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